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A RADICALLY IMMODEST JUDICIAL
MODESTY:
THE END OF FACIAL CHALLENGES TO
ABORTION REGULATIONS AND THE
FUTURE OF THE HEALTH EXCEPTION
IN THE ROBERTS ERA
B. Jessie Hill †
“This faux judicial restraint is judicial obfuscation.”

1

INTRODUCTION
If there is anything as strongly associated in the public mind with
Chief Justice John Roberts as his black robe and judicial
temperament, it is surely his claim to judicial modesty. In his
confirmation hearings, the Chief Justice expressed his desire “to be
known as a modest judge,” and several witnesses testified that he
exhibited such humility. 2 Of course, it is still early to assess whether
† Associate Professor and Associate Director, Center for Social Justice, Case Western
Reserve University School of Law. I would like to thank Justine Konicki for her extraordinarily
helpful research assistance.
1 FEC v. Wis. Right to Life (WRTL II), 551 U.S. 449, 474 n.7 (2007) (Scalia, J.
concurring in the judgment).
2 Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of John G. Roberts, Jr., To Be Chief Justice
of the United States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 158 (2005)
(statement of John G. Roberts, Jr., Nominee to be Chief Justice of the United States) [hereinafter
Roberts Confirmation Hearing]; see also Teresa Stanton Collett, Judicial Modesty and
Abortion, 59 S.C. L. REV. 701, 703 (2008) (suggesting that the Roberts Court’s two abortion
decisions “appear to foreshadow greater judicial restraint when reviewing abortion-related
legislation”); Frank B. Cross, Chief Justice Roberts and Precedent: A Preliminary Study, 86
N.C. L. REV. 1251, 1253–56 (2008) (discussing the claims about Chief Justice Roberts’s judicial
modesty, specifically in the form of his respect for precedent); Pamela S. Karlan, The Law of
Small Numbers: Gonzales v. Carhart, Parents Involved in Community Schools, and Some
Themes from the First Full Term of the Roberts Court, 86 N.C. L. REV. 1369, 1374 (2008) (“On
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the Chief Justice, and the Supreme Court as a whole, have followed
the Chief Justice’s professed imperative. But some commentators
have already begun to suggest that, at least so far, there are signs of
newfound judicial restraint in the Roberts Court. 3 One example is the
Roberts Court’s expressed preference for narrower, as-applied
decisionmaking in constitutional cases, as opposed to striking down
statutes on their face.
And indeed, the Supreme Court has turned away facial challenges
or otherwise expressed a preference for making decisions on an
as-applied basis in a number of cases since Chief Justice Roberts
joined the body. 4 Examples range across a wide spectrum of subject
matter, including voting rights cases, 5 an Americans with Disabilities
Act case, 6 and—somewhat more surprisingly, given the Supreme
Court’s traditional solicitude for facial challenges in these contexts—
First Amendment and abortion cases. 7 Of course, if this series of
Roberts Court cases indicates a trend, it is not an entirely new one. At
least since United States v. Salerno, 8 the 1987 case in which the Court
seemingly held that a statute should not be struck down on its face
unless “no set of circumstances exists under which the Act would be
valid,” 9 and arguably for some time before that, the Supreme Court
has expressed a preference for as-applied adjudication. 10

a number of occasions, Chief Justice Roberts has expressed a strong desire for the Court to
decide cases narrowly and unanimously.”); cf. Roberts Confirmation Hearing, supra, at 55
(asserting that judges should act with “a certain humility”).
3 See, e.g., Collett, supra note 2, at 703 (noting a growing sense of judicial restraint in
abortion-related cases); Edward A. Hartnett, Modest Hope for a Modest Roberts Court:
Deference, Facial Challenges, and the Comparative Competence of Courts, 59 SMU L. REV.
1735, 1756–57 (2006) (noting the Roberts Court’s favoritism toward as-applied challenges
across a broad range of cases).
4 Other commentators have remarked upon this phenomenon as well. See, e.g., Hartnett,
supra note 3, at 1756–57; Gillian E. Metzger, Facial and As-Applied Challenges Under the
Roberts Court, 36 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 773, 773 (2009). A recent issue of the Hastings
Constitutional Law Quarterly is dedicated to facial challenges and the Roberts Court.
5 Crawford v. Marion County Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181 (2008); Wash. State Grange v.
Wash. State Republican Party, 552 U.S. 442 (2008).
6 United States v. Georgia, 546 U.S. 151 (2006).
7 Wis. Right to Life, Inc. v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 546 U.S. 410 (2006); cf. Fed.
Election Comm’n v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449 (2007); Gonzales v. Carhart, 550
U.S. 124 (2007); Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood of N. New Eng., 546 U.S. 320 (2006). Both
Ayotte and United States v. Georgia were decided after Chief Justice Roberts had joined the
Court but before Justice Alito replaced Justice O’Connor in early 2006.
8 481 U.S. 739 (1987).
9 Id. at 745; see also Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 615 (1973) (holding, in a
First Amendment case, that because “facial overbreadth adjudication is an exception to our
traditional rules of practice,” such challenges should succeed only when the overbreadth is “not
only . . . real, but substantial as well, judged in relation to the statute’s plainly legitimate
sweep”). There is some debate over whether the Salerno Court’s language was ever meant to be
taken at face value. Compare Janklow v. Planned Parenthood, 517 U.S. 1174, 1175–76 (1996)
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But perhaps one of the most radical and important instances of the
Court’s rejection of a facial challenge was in Gonzales v. Carhart, 11
the federal “partial-birth” abortion ban case. The Court’s decision in
that case was highly unsettling with respect to prior precedent. It
upheld a criminal abortion statute that lacked an exception for cases
of medical necessity, despite the fact that the Court had consistently
emphasized the need for such an exception since Roe v. Wade. 12
Further, the Gonzales decision may have truly sweeping implications
for the future of substantive abortion doctrine. In this essay, I
therefore focus specifically on what the Roberts Court did in
Gonzales v. Carhart, as well as in its predecessor Ayotte v. Planned
Parenthood of Northern New England, 13 in order to consider the
meaning and impact of the Roberts Court’s preference for as-applied
adjudication in one specific area—abortion jurisprudence. Moreover,
I evaluate the likely impact of these rulings in light of Chief Justice
Roberts’s expressed preference for judicially modest rulings.
Of course, the expression “judicial modesty,” like its opposite
“judicial activism,” is a term that can mean many things to many
people—and consequently may not mean much at all. 14 As used in
connection with Chief Justice Roberts, however, it nonetheless seems
to have certain definable qualities. It appears to refer to a preference
for narrow, incremental rulings that do not overstep appropriate

(mem. of Stevens, J., on denial of cert.) (shedding doubt on the validity of Salerno’s “no set of
circumstances” language), with id. at 1178 (Scalia, J., dissenting from denial of cert.)
(describing the Salerno rule as “a long established principle of our jurisprudence” and asserting
that it applies even in abortion cases), and Ada v. Guam Soc’y of Obstetricians &
Gynecologists, 506 U.S. 1011, 1011 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting from denial of cert.). See
generally Marc E. Isserles, Overcoming Overbreadth: Facial Challenges and the Valid Rule
Requirement, 48 AM. U. L. REV. 359, 364 (1998) (arguing that Salerno’s “no set of
circumstances” language should be understood simply as “a descriptive claim about a statute
whose terms state an invalid rule of law”).
10 E.g., Yazoo & Miss. Valley R.R. Co. v. Jackson Vinegar Co., 226 U.S. 217, 219–20
(1912); accord In re Wellington, 33 Mass. (16 Pick.) 87, 96 (1834) (“[W]hether or not a case
can be imagined, in which an act of the legislature can be deemed absolutely void, we think it
quite clear, that when such act is alleged to be void, on the ground that it exceeds the just limits
of legislative power, and thus injuriously affects the rights of others, it is to be deemed void only
in respect to those particulars, and as against those persons, whose rights are thus affected.”);
see also OLIVER P. FIELD, THE EFFECT OF AN UNCONSTITUTIONAL STATUTE 6–8 (Da Capo
Press 1971) (1935) (discussing the phenomenon of “case-to-case” unconstitutionality or “partial
unconstitutionality,” which is essentially the same as as-applied unconstitutionality).
11 550 U.S. 124 (2007).
12 Id. at 168; Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 930 (2000) (reaffirming the Court’s
holding in Roe and Planned Parenthood v. Casey that a health exception is required for both
previability and postviability abortion regulations).
13 546 U.S. 320 (2006).
14 See, e.g., Michael J. Gerhardt, Constitutional Humility, 76 U. CIN. L. REV. 23, 52
(2007) (“[J]udicial modesty is no better than judicial activism—they may be political slogans to
defend decisions with which one agrees or to attack the decisions with which one disagrees.”).
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judicial bounds or decide unnecessary questions, but rather respect
the roles of the other branches of government and adhere to
precedent. 15 It is in this sense that I am using the term “judicial
modesty.”
Using this definition of judicial modesty, I argue that Ayotte and
Gonzales, which on their surface appear to indicate a preference for
modest, narrow rulings, are anything but modest in their implications.
These decisions call for federal judges to re-write legislation and to
make judgments in areas in which they have little expertise. They
thus assure continuing federal court involvement in micro-legislating
the scope of abortion rights. In addition, I argue that the holdings in
Gonzales and Ayotte, which ostensibly turn on the appropriateness of
facial challenges, are really about re-shaping the underlying
substantive constitutional law pertaining to abortion rights. As such,
they represent an instance of the remedial tail wagging the substantive
dog—a case of the proper remedy, as determined by the Supreme
Court, shaping the underlying right. In this sense, these cases form a
stark contrast with prior judicial practice, in which the availability of
facial invalidation depended at least in part on the nature of the
underlying substantive constitutional doctrine, rather than vice
versa. 16 Thus, although on the surface, the procedural aspects of
Gonzales and Ayotte raise concerns about the effect on plaintiffs’
access to courts to challenge abortion statutes, perhaps the more
important and far-reaching concern is how they will affect the future
nature of the abortion right itself.
In Part I of this essay, I set forth the difference between facial and
as-applied challenges and briefly summarize the scholarship
concerning the availability of facial challenges. I also note the
relationship between the facial/as-applied distinction and other
concepts such as standing, severability, and remedies, and I discuss
the history of facial challenges in the abortion context specifically. In
Part II, I describe the Supreme Court’s decisions in Ayotte and
Gonzales. Finally, in Part III, I explain why the Roberts Court’s stated
preference for as-applied challenges, at least as it has been
presented in the abortion cases, does not serve the end of
judicial modesty. In fact, those cases have far-reaching implications
for substantive abortion doctrine and promise to continue to
Id. at 37–38; see also Cross, supra note 2, at 1252.
See, e.g., Isserles, supra note 9, at 438-51 (explaining how certain doctrinal tests call for
a remedy of facial invalidation, such as tests forbidding laws enacted with a particular
legislative purpose; tests forbidding laws with certain content, such as voting restrictions based
on wealth or laws vesting excessive discretion in executive officials; and tests that “render
statutes making certain classifications or distinctions presumptively invalid”).
15
16
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embroil the federal courts intimately in future disputes over the
contours of the abortion right.
I. FACIAL AND AS-APPLIED CHALLENGES
Perhaps the only ground of agreement among scholars and jurists
with respect to facial and as-applied challenges is that the doctrine is
hopelessly muddled. 17 Debate has centered on the question of when a
facial challenge may be entertained as well as on the meaning of the
distinction—if any—itself. This confusion is further intensified by the
fact that the facial/as-applied distinction intersects and overlaps with
several other concepts, including standing, severability, and courts’
remedial powers. Moreover, there are multiple understandings of the
purposes behind the distinction and therefore multiple views about the
issue of when facial challenges should be available. This Part
nonetheless takes on the daunting task of explaining concisely the
main features of facial and as-applied challenges and of the scholarly
debate about their appropriateness.
A. The Meaning of “Facial” and “As-Applied” Challenges
A facial challenge is generally understood to be a challenge to a
law in all its applications; it is also often a claim that a law’s
unconstitutionality can be determined simply by looking at its
statutory language, independent of any particular set of facts or
litigants. 18 As-applied challenges, by contrast, involve the assertion
that a law is unconstitutional only in a specific circumstance or set of
circumstances, or with respect to a particular individual or group of
individuals. 19 However, even the description of the difference
17 See, e.g.¸ Caitlin E. Borgmann, Holding Legislatures Accountable Through Facial
Challenges, 36 Hastings Const. L.Q. 563, 569 (2009) (agreeing with one commentator that “the
‘facial’ and ‘as-applied’ terminology is more confusing than helpful”); Gillian E. Metzger,
Facial Challenges and Federalism, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 873, 878-80 (2005).
18 Metzger, supra note 17, at 881. Professor Metzger notes that this definition of facial
challenges is derived from Salerno, but that prior to Salerno, a broader definition of facial
challenges was in common use—one that assumed a facial challenge to a statute could
nonetheless assert unconstitutionality “in a particular range of applications” but still depended
primarily on the language of the law itself, rather than any particular set of facts. Id. at 881.
Such challenges may be considered synonymous with overbreadth challenges, although the term
“overbreadth challenge” usually refers only to those cases in which the unconstitutional
applications affect persons not before the court. See generally Isserles, supra note 9, at 366
(describing an overbreadth challenge as one in which “[a] litigant, against whom a particular
law can be constitutionally applied, argues that because distinct applications of the law to parties
not before the court would be unconstitutional, the court should facially invalidate the law and
deem it unenforceable against all parties”).
19 Again, Professor Metzger distinguishes between the pre-Salerno view of as-applied
challenges, which “were defined in fairly narrow terms synonymous with claims of privilege,”
from the broader post-Salerno view, which essentially considers an as-applied challenge to be a
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between facial and as-applied challenges is subject to dispute.
Moreover, it is doubtful whether the principles governing the
appropriateness and availability of facial challenges can be described
in any trans-substantive manner; rather, it seems that the shape,
meaning, and appropriateness of facial and as-applied challenges
differs depending on the specific constitutional doctrine under which
a given law is challenged. 20 This Part therefore briefly reviews the
broad contours of the scholarly debate over the meaning and
appropriateness of facial challenges and notes the relationship of this
doctrine to other doctrines such as standing, severability, and
remedies. It then describes the use, meaning, and importance of facial
challenges in one specific doctrinal context—the abortion context.
Some scholars have asserted that the very distinction between
facial and as-applied challenges is meaningless. Professor Richard
Fallon, for example, claims that every constitutional challenge is
actually an as-applied challenge because of the longstanding rule that
“[i]n order to raise a constitutional objection to a statute, a litigant
must always assert that the statute’s application to her case violates
the Constitution.” 21 In his view, facial invalidation of a law often
occurs simply as a consequence of the particular substantive doctrinal
test applied by the court. 22 To the extent that courts appear to
“invalidate” statutes on their face, however, such invalidation is not
actually within the power of courts to effect; rather, in the course
of ruling on an as-applied challenge, a court will often make
pronouncements that, through the mechanisms of preclusion doctrine
and stare decisis, have the effect of rendering a law unenforceable—
or at least unenforced—in all its applications. 23
Professor Matthew Adler, by contrast, has argued that all
constitutional challenges are facial challenges, in the sense that they
all vindicate a constitutional right against a certain kind of rule. 24
Constitutional law protects individuals against government adoption
of rules “with the wrong predicate or history”; thus the challenged
rule is in some sense always judged on its face (for example, in terms
of its purpose or its mode of drawing classifications) and without

claim of partial invalidity. Metzger, supra note 17, at 881.
20 Michael C. Dorf, Facial Challenges to State and Federal Statutes, 46 STAN. L. REV.
235, 294 (1994); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., As-Applied and Facial Challenges and Third-Party
Standing, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1321, 1351, 1369 (2000).
21 Fallon, Jr., supra note 20, at 1327.
22 Id. at 1336–39.
23 Id. at 1339–40.
24 Matthew D. Adler, Rights Against Rules: The Moral Structure of American
Constitutional Law, 97 MICH. L. REV. 1, 13–34 (1998).
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reference to the specific facts at hand. 25 As a result, he contends that
the doctrine of facial and as-applied challenges is simply a doctrine of
remedies “and no more than that. It is a doctrine that answers the
question: Where a rule is constitutionally invalid, should the
reviewing court repeal the invalid rule, or should the court instead
amend the rule in some way?” 26
Finally, Professor Michael Dorf argues that “[t]he distinction
between as-applied and facial challenges may confuse more than it
illuminates” and that “[i]n some sense, any constitutional challenge to
a statute is both as-applied,” in the sense that it must be applied to the
litigant in the case for standing purposes, “and facial,” in the sense
that “it attacks the statute that authorized the contested government
action.” 27 Thus, he, like Professor Fallon, argues that the “proper
approach to a constitutional case typically turns on the applicable
substantive constitutional doctrine,” as well as institutional
considerations such as whether the court is dealing with a challenge to
a state or federal statute. 28
As the views of these commentators suggest, the doctrine of facial
and as-applied challenges intersects and overlaps with several other
doctrines, including standing, severability, and judicial power to
shape equitable remedies, as well as the underlying substantive
constitutional doctrines in the case at hand. For example, the
availability of facial challenges is considered by some to be an
exception to traditional standing rules, according to which individuals
may assert their own rights and injuries but may not raise the rights of
those who are not before the court. 29 In a facial challenge, the litigant
is almost by definition challenging not only the statute’s application
to her particular factual circumstances but also the statute’s
application to everyone else not before the court to whom the statute
might be applied. 30 This is particularly true of so-called
“overbreadth” challenges—which are most prominent in the First
Amendment free speech context but also appear in the abortion
Id. at 14.
Id. at 158.
27 Dorf, supra note 20, at 294.
28 Id.
29 See, e.g., City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 55 n.22 (1999) (plurality opinion)
(“When asserting a facial challenge, a party seeks to vindicate not only his own rights, but those
of others who may also be adversely impacted by the statute in question. In this sense, the
threshold for facial challenges is a species of third party (jus tertii) standing, which we have
recognized as a prudential doctrine and not one mandated by Article III of the Constitution.”);
Henry Paul Monaghan, Third Party Standing, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 277, 277 (1984).
30 But see Henry Paul Monaghan, Overbreadth, 1981 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 3–4 (arguing that
overbreadth doctrine is more concerned with an individual’s right to be subjected only to
constitutionally valid rules than with standing to assert the rights of others).
25
26
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context 31 —whereby even a plaintiff whose conduct could
constitutionally be proscribed may raise the rights of third parties not
before the court if the challenged laws impinge on those third parties’
rights. 32 For this reason, some consider facial challenges to involve a
species of third-party standing, in which one individual who is injured
by a law raises the rights of persons not before the court in order to
achieve invalidation of the law. 33 Relatedly, Professor Gene Nichol
has demonstrated that facial challenges, especially those of the
preenforcement variety, are often in tension with the related
justiciability doctrine of ripeness, because no obvious present,
concrete harm usually exists in such preenforcement situations. 34
In addition, the terms “facial challenges” and “as-applied
challenges” appear to refer to something that plaintiffs do on the
“front end” of a lawsuit—that is, how the lawsuit is pleaded and the
case argued. Yet several commentators have reached the conclusion
that the doctrines of facial and as-applied challenges actually have
just as much or more to do with what happens on the “back end” of
the suit—that is, in the remedies phase. Thus, Professor Gillian
Metzger has said that “facial and as-applied challenges are . . .
differentiated by their effects. A successful facial challenge means
that the ‘state may not enforce [a statute] under any circumstances . . .
’; a successful as-applied challenge still allows the state to ‘enforce
the statute in different circumstances.’” 35 In essence, the viability of a
facial challenge turns on the availability of statutory severance, 36

31 See Dorf, supra note 20, at 261; see also RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., ET AL., HART &
WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 195 (5th ed. 2003) (citing
Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Making Sense of Overbreadth, 100 YALE L.J. 853, 859 n.29 (1991));
Fallon, supra note 20, at 1355–56 (noting that scholars debate whether Planned Parenthood v.
Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992), stands for the proposition that overbreadth challenges are allowed
“under a uniform standard in all fundamental rights cases”); David L. Franklin, Facial
Challenges, Legislative Purpose, and the Commerce Clause, 92 IOWA L. REV. 41, 55 & nn. 6768 (2006) (observing that “the Court has sometimes applied a species of overbreadth doctrine”
in cases other than First Amendment cases, including abortion cases).
32 See FALLON ET AL., supra note 31, at 190–91; Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Linkage
Between Justiciability and Remedies—and Their Connections to Substantive Rights, 92 VA. L.
REV. 633, 675–76 (2006) (noting that the First Amendment overbreadth doctrine is an exception
to the presumption of separability that normally prevents challenges to a statute on the basis that
it is unconstitutionally applied to others).
33 See, e.g., Morales, 527 U.S. at 55 n.22. See generally FALLON ET AL., supra note 31, at
187–95 (describing third-party standing doctrine). But see Monaghan, supra note 29, at 282–86
(distinguishing overbreadth from third-party standing).
34 Gene R. Nichol, Jr., Ripeness and the Constitution, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 153, 164–70
(1987).
35 Metzger, supra note 17, at 880–81 (quoting Dorf, supra note 20, at 236) (first alteration
in original).
36 Id. at 885–89; Metzger, supra note 4, at 791–92.
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which in turn often depends on state severability law and
determinations of a legislature’s intent. 37
B. The Expressed Preference for As-Applied Adjudication
Despite the widespread availability of facial invalidation in at least
certain types of cases, the Supreme Court has repeatedly stated that
as-applied challenges are to be preferred. This preference has been
particularly pronounced in the Roberts Court. Thus, the Court has
pointed out that as-applied challenges serve the interests of judicial
modesty and separation of powers in many ways, including that
as-applied challenges do not require courts to interpret statutes
without a concrete fact scenario; 38 they prevent courts from making
unnecessary constitutional decisions; 39 and, by invalidating as little of
the law as possible, they minimize the degree to which a ruling of
unconstitutionality frustrates the will of the people as embodied in the
actions of the legislative branch. 40
At the same time, facial invalidation can serve important purposes.
Most obviously, facial challenges better protect constitutional rights,
in that they save individuals from having to go through costly
and time-consuming litigation to challenge each potentially
unconstitutional application of a statute. 41 By allowing parties to raise
the rights of others not before the court, they also minimize the
chilling effect of those statutes on individuals who might be
37 See, e.g., Leavitt v. Jane L., 518 U.S. 137, 139 (1996) (“Severability is of course a
question of state law”); Brockett v. Spokane Arcades, 472 U.S. 491, 506 & n.15 (1985) (noting
the importance of legislative intent in state and federal severability decisions).
38 See, e.g., Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 168 (2007) (“‘[I]t would indeed be
undesirable for this Court to consider every conceivable situation which might possibly arise in
the application of complex and comprehensive legislation.’” (quoting United States v. Raines,
362 U.S. 17, 21 (1960)) (alteration in original)).
39 Cf. Wash. State Grange v. Wash. State Republican Party, 552 U.S. 442, 450 (2008)
(noting that when the Court uses judicial restraint in a facial challenge, the Court can avoid
unnecessarily and prematurely deciding a constitutional issue).
40 Id. at 1191 (“[F]acial challenges threaten to short circuit the democratic process by
preventing laws embodying the will of the people from being implemented in a manner
consistent with the Constitution. We must keep in mind that ‘“[a] ruling of unconstitutionality
frustrates the intent of the elected representatives of the people.”’” (quoting Ayotte v. Planned
Parenthood of N. New Eng., 546 U.S. 320, 329 (2006) (quoting Regan v. Time, Inc., 468 U.S.
641, 652 (1984) (plurality opinion)))); cf. Metzger, supra note 4, at 774 (noting that the Roberts
Court “has justified its preference for as-applied claims on diverse grounds,” including “the
current lack of evidence about how a measure will actually operate and the dangers of
speculative adjudication,” the desire for narrower rulings when a statute is constitutional in most
of its applications, and perhaps to avoid the applicability of precedent with which the Court
disagrees).
41 See, e.g., Borgmann, supra note 17, at 593–94 (describing the impracticality of casespecific as-applied challenges); David H. Gans, Strategic Facial Challenges, 85 B.U. L. REV.
1333, 1334–35 (2005) (discussing the differences between facial and as-applied challenges,
noting that facial challenges can be more efficient and less costly).
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unwilling, or simply lack the incentive, to challenge the law
themselves. 42 Moreover, some substantive constitutional doctrines
seem to mandate facial invalidation, because there is no way to sever
the unconstitutional parts of a statute. This would be the case with
respect to laws motivated by an unconstitutional purpose, for
example, or laws that are vague on their face. 43
C. Facial Challenges in Abortion Jurisprudence
Facial challenges have long been of central importance in the
abortion context. 44 The seminal abortion case, Roe v. Wade, 45 was a
facial challenge to Texas’s criminal abortion statutes. The
pseudonymous Jane Roe, the only plaintiff found to have standing,
was described by the Court as an unmarried, pregnant woman who
wished to have an abortion but was unable to do so under Texas law,
because her life was not threatened by the pregnancy and she could
not afford to travel to a state with more liberal criminal abortion
laws. 46 Yet the Court held the Texas law unconstitutional as applied
not just to her but in its entirety, and it set out a “trimester”
framework for abortion regulations that in many respects had nothing
to do with Jane Roe’s situation. 47 For example, the Court held in Roe
that states could outlaw abortions in the third trimester but had to
provide exceptions allowing abortions when the woman’s health or
42 See Borgmann, supra note 17, at 597; Gans, supra note 41, at 1353–64 (arguing that
“courts invalidate statutes on their face to protect absent third parties from the chilling effect
that results from the threat of sanctions under the challenged statute”).
43 See Fallon, supra note 20, at 1342–56; Gans, supra note 41, at 1356–87 (discussing
facial invalidation of vague laws); Isserles, supra note 9, at 387, 400 (discussing “valid rule”
facial challenges); Note, After Ayotte: The Need to Defend Abortion Rights with Renewed
“Purpose,” 119 HARV. L. REV. 2552, 2569–70 (2006); cf. Borgmann, supra note 17, at 598–
609 (arguing that facial challenges are particularly appropriate “where legislatures either ignore
clear constitutional rulings protecting individual rights or where they … base statutes on a
questionable factual foundation,” in part because such actions may indicate improper legislative
purpose).
44 See Borgmann, supra note 17, at 597–98.
45 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
46 Id. at 120. Other plaintiffs had joined Roe initially, including a physician who had been
arrested for violating the Texas laws and a married couple who had been advised to avoid
childbirth due to the wife’s health problems. Id. at 120-22. Interestingly, Norma McCorvey, the
individual who sued pseudonymously as Jane Roe, initially asserted to her lawyers that the
pregnancy was the result of rape, but the attorneys decided not to press this allegation in court,
partly due to strategic considerations about the sort of relief they wanted to obtain. As Sarah
Weddington, lead counsel for Jane Roe, explained, “‘[W]e did not want the Texas law changed
only to allow abortion in cases of rape. We wanted a decision that abortion was covered by the
right of privacy.’” Kevin C. McMunigal, Of Causes and Clients: Two Tales of Roe v. Wade, 47
HASTINGS L.J. 779, 794 (1996) (quoting SARAH WEDDINGTON, A QUESTION OF CHOICE 52–53
(1992)).
47 See Michael Abramowicz & Maxwell Stearns, Defining Dicta, 57 STAN L. REV. 953,
1078–84 (2005).
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life was in danger. 48 Had the Court not entertained Jane Roe’s claims
as a facial challenge, it is unclear how she could have had standing to
challenge the Texas act’s postviability applications. Roe was not
claiming a medical need for her procedure. She therefore would not
have been entitled to an injunction prohibiting the law’s enforcement
in such postviability circumstances if the Court had limited Roe’s
challenge to the statute as it applied to her. 49
Subsequent to Roe, most challenges to abortion restrictions have
been brought as facial challenges—often pre-enforcement facial
challenges—by clinics or individual abortion providers rather than
individual women seeking abortions. 50 Thus, clinics or providers,
asserting third-party standing to vindicate the rights of the women
they serve, file suit in advance of the law’s effective date against state
executive officials charged with criminal enforcement of the laws. 51
Because those providers usually perform an array of abortion
procedures for various reasons to women in various circumstances
and at various stages of pregnancy, this litigation structure allows for
a broad-based attack on criminal abortion statutes. Such laws may be
attacked as imposing an unconstitutional undue burden on a particular
class of women, for example; a wide range of evidence may then be
introduced to demonstrate the effects of the law on particular
groups. 52 Or the laws may be attacked as unconstitutional for lack of
a health exception, in which case a large amount of scientific
evidence pertaining to the wide variety of medical conditions
necessitating an abortion can be introduced. 53 The nature of the
plaintiffs and their claims thus allows a broad range of relevant
medical and social science evidence to come before the courts, which

Roe, 410 U.S. at 164–65.
Roe did purport to sue “on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated,” Roe v.
Wade, 314 F. Supp. 1217, 1219 n.1 (D. Tex. 1970), but the Supreme Court did not explore the
“class aspects” of the case and therefore apparently did not rely on that language when deciding
the case, Roe, 410 U.S. at 124.
50 Major abortion cases litigated in this manner include Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124
(2007), Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914 (2000), Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505
U.S. 833 (1992), Ohio v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, 497 U.S. 502 (1990), and
Thonburgh v. American College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747 (1986), among
others.
51 See sources cited supra note 50. Of course, this litigation posture does not work well for
laws that simply authorize civil suits against abortion providers rather than criminal sanctions,
because there is no defendant charged with enforcement of the law and no immediate threat of
sanctions. See, e.g., Okpalobi v. Foster, 244 F.3d 405 (5th Cir. 1999) (en banc) (turning away a
challenge to such a law). See generally Caitlin Borgmann, Legislative Arrogance and
Constitutional Accountability, 79 S. CAL. L. REV. 753, 758–72 (2006) (discussing legislatures’
use of tort law to evade constitutional mandates).
52 See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa., 505 U.S. at 887–95.
53 Stenberg, 530 U.S. at 923–29.
48
49
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in turn permits evaluation of the law’s constitutionality in a broad
range of circumstances and applications. 54
Courts have shown an abiding willingness to accept facial
challenges in abortion cases since Roe while also finding exceptions
to traditional rules pertaining to mootness and the prudential bar on
third-party standing. 55 This exceptional treatment of abortion cases is
justified in large part by the reasons that usually ground courts’
acceptance of facial challenges. First, if piecemeal litigation by
individual women were required in every case, it is highly unlikely
that the underlying constitutional right would be sufficiently
protected. Due to the inherent time limitations, as well as the
intensely private nature of the issue, it is unlikely that individual
women would possess sufficient incentive to go to court to vindicate
their rights. Although mootness doctrine does not apply to bar suits
by pregnant women, the likelihood is great that any individual
plaintiff would be well beyond the time limit for obtaining a
previability abortion by the time the court issued even preliminary
relief. 56 For this reason, challenges are often instead brought by
clinics or physicians, who are themselves subject to penalties under
the challenged abortion laws but who are actually asserting the
substantive due process rights of their patients. As noted above, this
litigation structure in turn lends itself to challenging laws in all, or
virtually all, of their applications.
Moreover, easy availability of facial challenges in the abortion
context may be justified by concerns about the chilling effect of the
abortion restrictions, and in particular those that carry criminal
penalties. It is fair to surmise that physicians as a whole are a riskaverse group, and they by and large do not wish to wait until they
have been criminally prosecuted under a statute to challenge it. If a
criminal abortion restriction is in place and its enforceability or even
the extent of its applicability is unclear, there is a danger that
physicians will steer far clear of the prohibited practice, even if legal
opinion indicates that the prohibition is likely unconstitutional. As
such, facial challenges—especially the pre-enforcement variety—are
necessary to avoid overdeterrence of doctors. Indeed,
54

Cf. Borgmann, supra note 17, at 596 (noting that in some constitutional cases, “[t]he
legal standards themselves generally call for a broader examination of social facts”).
55 See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 62 (1976);
Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 112–18 (1976). But see Ada v. Guam Soc’y of Obstetricians
& Gynecol., 506 U.S. 1011 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) (arguing that
a facial challenge to a criminal abortion statute should not have been permitted).
56 See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 124–25 (1973) (noting that the plaintiff Jane Roe
was no longer pregnant and that the usual pregnancy would rarely last beyond the trial phase of
a lawsuit).

3/24/2009 9:39:56 PM

2009]

A RADICALLY IMMODEST JUDICIAL MODESTY

13

the fact that an abortion can only be carried out with the aid
of a third party—typically a doctor—renders the right to
choose an abortion particularly susceptible to a chilling
effect. To exercise her right of choice, both the pregnant
woman and the necessary medical personnel must have
sufficient courage to disregard the chilling effect of potential
state sanctions. 57
II. AYOTTE AND GONZALES
Without paying much heed to the reasons supporting the
widespread acceptance of facial challenges in abortion litigation, the
Roberts Court, in two separate cases, appeared to herald the end of
such challenges and a newfound enthusiasm for as-applied abortion
litigation. In Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood of Northern New England,
the Court vacated and remanded for a determination of whether a
narrower remedy than total invalidation of a parental notification law
would be appropriate. 58 And in Gonzales v. Carhart, the Court simply
turned away a facial challenge to the federal Partial Birth Abortion
Ban Act while leaving the door open to an as-applied challenge. 59
This section discusses each of these cases in turn.
Ayotte was a challenge to a New Hampshire law requiring
physicians to notify a parent or legal guardian of any pregnant minor
seeking an abortion at least forty-eight hours before the procedure is
performed. 60 Although parental notification laws are generally
constitutional, 61 this law was alleged to be unconstitutional because it
lacked a health exception—an exception allowing the procedure to be
performed without meeting the notice requirement in cases of medical
emergency. 62 Both the district court and the First Circuit Court of
Appeals had held the law unconstitutional.

Dorf, supra note 20, at 271 (footnote omitted).
Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood of N. New Eng., 546 U.S. 320, 331–32 (2006).
59 Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 167–68 (2007).
60 Ayotte, 546 U.S. at 323–24.
61 Hodgson v Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417, 422–23 (1990) (plurality opinion) (upholding
constitutionality of Minnesota parental notification requirement for minors seeking abortions, as
long as certain minors have the opportunity to obtain a court order allowing them to avoid the
notification requirement); Bellotti v. Baird, 442 U.S. 622, 647–48 (1979) (plurality opinion)
(holding Massachusetts’ parental consent law unconstitutional but affirming that states may
require parental involvement in the abortion decision in certain circumstances).
62 Ayotte, 546 U.S. at 326. The plaintiffs had also challenged the New Hampshire law’s
lack of confidentiality for minors seeking to bypass the notification requirement, but the district
court did not rule on this claim, and therefore neither the court of appeals nor the Supreme Court
addressed it. Planned Parenthood of N. New Eng. v. Heed, 390 F.3d 53, 56–57 (2004).
57
58
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Before the Supreme Court, the state had apparently conceded that
“it would be unconstitutional to apply the Act in a manner that
subjects minors to significant health risks,” thus allowing the Court to
avoid the substantive constitutional issues. 63 Instead, in a brief
unanimous opinion, 64 the Court focused primarily on the question of
remedy and held that, while a parental notification statute may be
unconstitutional without a health exception because it may subject at
least some minors to serious risks to their health, it was not clearly
necessary for the Court to invalidate the statute in its entirety. 65 The
Court therefore sent the case back to the court of appeals to decide
whether a more “modest remedy” might be available, such as
invalidating only the law’s unconstitutional applications. 66 The Court
noted that this inquiry turned on “legislative intent,” and therefore
encouraged the lower court to avoid wholly invalidating a statute if
the legislature would not have wanted that result. 67 At the same time,
the Court emphasized that legislatures should not be given an
incentive to write overly broad statutes and leave it to the courts to
separate the constitutional applications from the unconstitutional
ones. 68 However, the Court did not give much guidance as to how
lower courts are to exercise their discretion or balance those
competing considerations in crafting remedies in such cases, aside
from its citation to a number of cases involving severance of state or
federal statutes. 69
In Carhart v. Gonzales, the Roberts Court turned away a facial
challenge to the federal Partial Birth Abortion Ban Act (“PBABA”),
which outlaws a particular second-trimester abortion procedure
known as “D&X” or “intact D&E.” 70 There were two primary
grounds of attack on the statute. The first attack was that the PBABA
was both unconstitutionally vague and so broadly written as to sweep
in other, more common abortion procedures (including those used
early in pregnancy) and therefore constituted an undue burden on the

Ayotte, 546 U.S. at 328.
The opinion was Justice O’Connor’s last.
65 Ayotte, 546 U.S. at 331.
66 Id.
67 Id. at 330–31.
68 Id.
69 Id. at 330 (citing United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 227 (2005); Minnesota v.
Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians, 526 U.S. 172, 191 (1999); Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. Brock,
480 U.S. 678, 684 (1987); Champlin Refining Co. v. Corp. Comm’n of Okla., 286 U.S. 210, 234
(1932); The Employers’ Liability Cases, 207 U.S. 463, 501 (1908); Allen v. Louisiana, 103 U.S.
80, 83–84 (1880); Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82, 97–98 (1879)). In the wake of the Ayotte
decision, New Hampshire repealed the parental notification statute. 2007 N.H. Laws 265.
70 550 U.S. 124, 166–67 (2007).
63
64
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abortion right. 71 This was one ground on which the plaintiffs had
prevailed in the 2000 case Stenberg v. Carhart, 72 in which the
Supreme Court struck down Nebraska’s “partial-birth” abortion
ban. 73 The second ground of attack was that the statute lacked a
health exception allowing the procedure to be performed when
necessary to preserve the health of the woman. 74
Because the federal statute was more clearly aimed at one
particular abortion procedure than the Nebraska statute that the Court
had struck down in Stenberg, the Court rejected that basis for
challenging the statute. 75 With respect to the health exception issue,
however, the Court did an odd thing. The statute appeared to directly
contravene the Supreme Court’s holding in Stenberg, which stated
that a D&X ban had to have a health exception to be constitutional. 76
Indeed, that health exception requirement had been in place since Roe
v. Wade itself. 77 In the place of a health exception, Congress had
included in the PBABA a series of dubious factual findings, declaring
that a health exception was unnecessary and that the courts were
required to defer to its factual findings. 78 The Court in Gonzales
nonetheless upheld the statute against a facial challenge, largely
because in the Court’s view there was a dispute of medical fact over
whether a health exception is necessary in a D&X ban—that is,
whether the procedure is ever medically necessary. 79 Moreover, while
the Court noted that it normally defers to legislative judgment on
disputed questions of scientific fact, in this case it had reason to doubt
the quality of Congress’s factfinding (such as the fact that many of
those found “facts” were demonstrably false), and so it declined to
defer to—or at least to place “dispositive weight” on—Congress’s
findings. 80 It nonetheless asserted that factual disputes—such as the
dispute over the circumstances, if any, in which D&X is medically
required to avoid serious health risks—are best worked out in the
Id. at 146–47, 150.
530 U.S. 914 (2000).
73 Id. at 939–40.
74 Gonzales, 550 U.S. at 161. The statute did contain a life exception, allowing life-saving
abortions. Id. at 141–42 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 1531(a) (2000 & Supp. IV 2006)).
75 Id. at 147–56.
76 Id. at 166 (citing Stenberg, 530 U.S. at 938).
77 410 U.S. 113, 164–65 (1973) (holding that, post-viability, “the State . . . may . . .
regulate, and even proscribe, abortion except where it is necessary, in appropriate medical
judgment, for the preservation of the life or health of the mother.”).
78 Congressional Findings (5)–(14), in notes following 18 U.S.C. § 1531 (2000 ed., Supp.
IV), p. 769.
79 Gonzales, 550 U.S. at 166–67 (“The Act is not invalid on its face where there is
uncertainty over whether the barred procedure is ever necessary to preserve a woman's health,
given the availability of other abortion procedures that are considered to be safe alternatives.”).
80 Id. at 165.
71
72
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context of an as-applied challenge, not a facial challenge, and
primarily for that reason the Court turned away the facial challenge. 81
The
Court’s
decision
in
Gonzales
was
surprising in a number of respects, but for purposes of this essay, I
shall describe only a few of them. First, based on a record that was no
less favorable to the plaintiffs than the record before the Court in
Stenberg, the Supreme Court reached an essentially opposite result;
yet it never claimed to be overruling Stenberg. 82 The only meaningful
differences between the facts of Stenberg and Gonzales are that, in
Gonzales, there were explicit factual findings to support the
Government’s view, as opposed to mere state legislative history
supporting the state’s view in Stenberg, and that Gonzales dealt with
a federal statute, whereas Stenberg dealt with a state statute. 83 But the
Gonzales Court made it fairly clear that neither of these differences
accounted for the differing results; instead, the Court disavowed the
notion that any necessity of deferring to explicit legislative findings
of fact played a dispositive role in its decision. 84 Indeed, the Court
went so far as to assert that it “retains an independent constitutional
duty to review factual findings where constitutional rights are at
stake.” 85 Moreover, the Court did not suggest that federalism
concerns—such as a desire to defer more to Congress, a coordinate
branch of the federal government, than to state legislatures—played
any role in its differing treatment of the two statutes. 86
Yet, in the end, the Court turned away a facial challenge in a case
almost identical to one in which the Court had previously
emphatically sustained one. It seems that the only way to understand
the Court’s decision to reject a facial challenge in Gonzales that it had
embraced in Stenberg comes from Ayotte, in which the Court
observed that “the parties in Stenberg did not ask for, and [the Court]
did not contemplate, relief more finely drawn.” 87 In other words, the
Id. at 167.
Id. at 177–80 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (discussing the evidence before the trial courts
in the cases at bar and noting the “undisguised conflict with Stenberg”).
83 Id. at 132 (majority op.); Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 921 (2000).
84 Gonzales, 550 U.S. at 165–66 (stating that “[u]ncritical deference to Congress’ factual
findings . . . is inappropriate” and that the Court would not place “dispositive weight” on them).
85 Id. at 165 (citing Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 60 (1932)).
86 Some commentators have observed that, in general, the Roberts Court does not seem as
interested in or sympathetic to federalism concerns as the Rehnquist Court was. See, e.g., David
Franklin, The Roberts Court, the 2008 Election & the Future of the Judiciary, 6 DEPAUL BUS.
& COMM. L.J. 513, 518–20 (2008); Simon Lazarus, Federalism R.I.P.? Did the Roberts
Hearings Junk the Rehnquist Court’s Federalism Revolution?, 56 DEPAUL L. REV. 1, 30–31
(2006).
87 Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood of N. New Eng., 546 U.S. 320, 331 (2006). At least one
commentator has suggested that the disjunction between the results in Gonzales and Stenberg
suggests that the Court is using its stated preference for as-applied adjudication strategically, in
81
82
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Government in Gonzales, unlike the State of Nebraska in Stenberg,
requested, inter alia, a more limited remedy than facial invalidation. 88
The Court thus suggested that it would have granted a more limited
remedy in Stenberg if the state had asked for it.
A second unusual feature of the Supreme Court’s decision is that it
left the door open to a “preenforcement, as-applied challenge[]” to the
PBABA. 89 In such a challenge, the Court explained, plaintiffs would
have to show that “in discrete and well-defined instances a particular
condition has or is likely to occur in which the procedure prohibited
by the Act must be used.” 90 The Court suggested that in such a
context, “the nature of the medical risk can be better quantified and
balanced than in a facial attack.” 91 The Court’s statement almost
certainly assumes that, as in Stenberg and Gonzales, the challenge
would be brought by abortion providers asserting third-party standing
on behalf of their patients, since it is hard to imagine any individual
woman who would have standing to bring such a challenge, much
less the desire to do so. In order to have standing, the woman would
presumably have to argue that she was going to become pregnant and
face a health-threatening (but not life-threatening) condition that
required use of the D&X procedure in particular. What is strange
about the Court’s openness to a pre-enforcement as-applied challenge
in such a case, then, is that the challenge would be functionally
identical to what the plaintiffs in Gonzales in fact did. As Justice
Ginsburg pointed out in her dissent, “the record already include[d]
hundreds and hundreds of pages of testimony identifying ‘discrete
and well-defined instances’ in which recourse to an intact D & E
would better protect the health of women with particular
conditions.” 92 The existence of such conditions was one of the
principal issues around which the three lengthy bench trials on the
constitutionality of the PBABA turned. 93

order to avoid precedent with which it disagrees. Metzger, supra note 4, at 774, 800.
88 Brief for the Petitioners, Gonzales v. Carhart (Nos. 05-380, 05-1382), 2006 WL
228212, at 40-47; Brief for Petitioner, Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood of N. New Eng. (No. 041144), 2005 WL 1920929, at 43-46; Brief of Petitioners, Stenberg v. Carhart (No. 99-830), 2000
WL 228615.
89 Gonzales, 550 U.S. at 167.
90 Id.
91 Id.
92 Id. at 189–90 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
93 Id. at 161–63 (majority op.) (reciting lower court evidence pertaining to the safety and
medical necessity of intact D&E). Indeed, one commentator has referred to the Court’s allusion
to a future as-applied challenge as a “[f]alse [p]romise.” Borgmann, supra note 17, at 593.
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In both Ayotte and Gonzales, the Court talked the talk of judicial
modesty when declining to uphold facial invalidations. In Ayotte, the
Court described more limited invalidation of the New Hampshire law
as “narrow” and “modest” but also expressed concern for the
limitations of both its “constitutional mandate and institutional
competence” should it wade too far into the task of re-writing a state
statute. 94 In Gonzales, the Court similarly expressed concern about its
“obligation [and] institutional role” if it were to “resolve questions of
constitutionality with respect to . . . ‘every conceivable situation
which might possibly arise in the application of complex and
comprehensive legislation.’” 95 I nonetheless argue, in the remainder
of this essay, that there is almost nothing modest about what the Court
did in Ayotte and Gonzales. On the contrary, those decisions threaten
separation of powers, require judges to remain embroiled in the
abortion controversy and decide issues arguably well beyond their
competency, and—even more dramatically—appear to be a step
toward reshaping a major facet of abortion jurisprudence that has
been in place since Roe v. Wade—namely, the health exception.
III. AN IMMODEST MODESTY
Before explaining the ways in which the Court’s decisions in
Ayotte and Gonzales were far more radical than modest in their future
implications, I wish first to set out my view of the Court’s actual
intention in Gonzales, and particularly of its decision to turn away a
facial challenge while accepting the possibility of a future
pre-enforcement as-applied challenge. I believe that Gonzales can
only be understood in light of Ayotte as an attempt to finish what
Ayotte started. Since the Court in Gonzales accepted the future
possibility of an as-applied challenge that would be the same in
virtually all respects as the facial challenge it rejected, it seems that it
must have been ultimately concerned neither with the way in which
the challenge to the PBABA was structured nor with the kind of
evidence presented to the lower courts but rather with the remedy the
plaintiffs ultimately achieved. Had the Court in Gonzales wanted to
require that future challenges to abortion regulations be brought by
individual women currently seeking the procedure—a requirement
that would essentially mean the end of, or at least a sharp reduction

94
95

Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood of N. New Eng., 546 U.S. 320, 329, 331 (2006).
Gonzales, 550 U.S. at 168 (quoting United States v. Raines, 362 U.S. 17, 21 (1960)).
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in, constitutional challenges to abortion restrictions 96 —it certainly
would not have spoken in terms of “pre-enforcement” as-applied
challenges. Rather, it must have assumed that a future preenforcement as-applied challenge would very much resemble the
challenge currently before the Court but that—as in Ayotte—the
remedy would not be facial invalidation.
Of course, the Court’s decision to reject the constitutional
challenge altogether in Gonzales, rather than to remand the cases for
the lower courts to shape a more precise remedy, was puzzling. 97 But
this decision could be understood either as a political move—so that
the Court was not seen as agreeing with the lower courts’ decision to
strike down the PBABA 98 —or as an attempt to send a particularly
strong message to future plaintiffs that they must not, in the future,
seek facial invalidation of abortion regulations whose only flaw is the
lack of a health exception. In other words, the Court established in
Ayotte that a more limited remedy than facial invalidation was
appropriate in health-exception cases; in Gonzales, it made good on
that claim by demonstrating that in the future, inappropriate facial
challenges could properly be turned away, without an opportunity for
the plaintiffs to seek their second-choice form of relief—partial
invalidation.
This section therefore proceeds on the assumption that the primary
significance of the Court’s decision to turn away the facial challenge
in Gonzales has to do with the shape and scope of the injunction
against enforcement of the law that district courts will have to issue in

96 See id. at 189 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“Surely the Court cannot mean that no suit
may be brought until a woman’s health is immediately jeopardized by the ban on intact D&E. A
woman ‘suffer[ing] from medical complications’ needs access to the medical procedure at once
and cannot wait for the judicial process to unfold.” (citation omitted) (alteration in original)).
Some challenges to restrictive abortion policies do continue to be brought by individual women
seeking abortions, particularly in the prison context. See, e.g., Roe v. Crawford, 514 F.3d 789
(8th Cir.) (upholding a challenge by an inmate to a corrections department policy of essentially
prohibiting nontherapeutic abortions for prisoners), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 109 (2008); Victoria
W. v. Larpenter, 369 F.3d 475 (5th Cir. 2004) (rejecting an individual inmate’s challenge to a
prison policy requiring inmates to get a court order before obtaining nontherapeutic abortions).
As discussed above, however, most challenges are by clinics or physicians or both.
97 Cf. Gonzales, 550 U.S. at 189 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (noting that the Court does not
“explain why the injunctions ordered by the District Courts should not remain in place, trimmed
only to exclude instances in which another procedure would safeguard a woman’s health at least
equally well”); see also Maya Manian, Rights, Remedies, and Facial Challenges, 36 HASTINGS
CONST. L.Q. 611, 618–19 (2009) (noting that “[i]f total invalidation of the federal ban seemed
too sweeping for the Court, it could have followed the approach taken in Ayotte and remanded
for consideration of a more limited injunction”).
98 Cf. Metzger, supra note 4, at 774 (suggesting that the Roberts Court has shown a
preference for as-applied litigation and turned away facial challenges in some instances
strategically, as a way of avoiding precedent with which the Court disagrees).
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future abortion cases. 99 This conclusion roughly accords with the
views of the few lower courts that have dealt with challenges to
abortion statutes that lack health exceptions in the wake of Ayotte and
Gonzales. 100 Moreover, this understanding should not come as a
surprise, given that many commentators have observed that the
doctrine of facial and as-applied challenges is primarily a doctrine
concerning remedies. 101 Nonetheless, I argue in this final section that
none of the pronounced rationales for preferring as-applied litigation
over facial challenges justifies the Court’s approach in Ayotte and
Gonzales and that the Court has not only put modesty aside but also
threatened to radically reshape substantive abortion doctrine with its
decisions in those cases.
First, to the extent that the Court’s desire not to nullify more of a
law than is absolutely necessary indicates solicitude for legislative
prerogative and legislative intent, it must be acknowledged that
this solicitude is not necessarily well served by a preference for
partial invalidation of state laws. Indeed, shifting the focus of
health-exception jurisprudence from constitutional doctrine to the
issue of remedy instead encourages federal courts to exercise
enormous discretion and to make judgments about legislators’ intent
in a highly unguided way. As David Gans has recently pointed out,
severability doctrine confers on judges the responsibility of
“[a]ggressive [j]udicial [l]awmaking,” especially since “[l]egislative
99 Professor Michael Dorf seems to reject this understanding of Gonzales, as he suggests
that reading the case to take seriously the possibility of future pre-enforcement as-applied
challenges by doctors asserting the rights of their patients under a theory of third-party standing
would mean “that exception swallows the holding of the case.” Michael C. Dorf, Abortion
Rights, 23 TOURO L. REV. 815, 825 (2008).
100 In neither Ayotte nor Gonzales have the parties litigated the scope of the injunction to a
final conclusion after remand. Only two federal appellate cases have grappled significantly with
the impact of Gonzales’ and Ayotte’s holdings with respect to facial challenges. In Northland
Family Planning Clinic. Inc. v. Cox, 487 F.3d 323 (6th Cir. 2007), the Sixth Circuit observed
Gonzales appeared to suggest that “facial challenges are not the preferred mechanism for
challenges pertaining to health exceptions to prohibitions on the D & X procedure,” but that the
scope of Gonzales’ applicability was unclear in the case at bar. Id. at 340. It then discussed
Ayotte when deciding on the scope of the injunction to be issued against Michigan’s Legal Birth
Definition Act and held that the Act could nonetheless be enjoined in its entirety because it was
broad enough to sweep other procedures besides D&X within its prohibitions. Id. at 333–37.
Similarly, the Fourth Circuit in Richmond Medical Center for Women v. Herring, 527 F.3d 128
(4th Cir. 2008), vacated, 570 F.3d 165 (2009) (en banc), asserted that Gonzales did not
“question the established validity of facial challenges to abortion statutes” outside the healthexception context, and then cited Ayotte in the course of determining the extent of the proper
injunction invalidating Virginia’s “Partial Birth Infanticide” Act. Id. at 146, 149. The
subsequent opinion by the en banc Fourth Circuit followed the route of Gonzales more closely,
however, in determining that the plaintiff’s facial challenge would fail and that his as-applied
challenge “cannot be addressed” due to the lack of factual record. Richmond Med. Ctr., 570
F.3d at 180.
101 Metzger, supra note 4, at 791–92 & nn.77–78 (citing sources).
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intent, as a test, does little to constrain courts from using severability
doctrine to rewrite statues in substantial fashion.” 102 Determinations
of legislative intent, after all, are both difficult and extremely
malleable, and they often must be reached without reliable guideposts
from the legislature itself. Thus, the effect of the Roberts Court’s
decisions in Ayotte and Gonzales is that parties will have to fight over
the appropriate scope of an injunction against an unconstitutional
abortion regulation and over what the legislature would have wanted,
with no real standards for making that judgment, and in a highly
politicized arena.
Second, the Court has not actually encouraged any more factfinding by the lower courts before ruling on the constitutionality of
abortion restrictions or ensured that concrete fact scenarios will be
before those courts in the future. Indeed, Gonzales contemplates
the continuing availability of pre-enforcement as-applied challenges
in the abortion context and did not appear to question the validity
of third-party standing in those cases. 103 As noted above, future
as-applied challenges to abortion restrictions will presumably
be functionally identical to the facial challenges before the Court
in Ayotte and Gonzales; the only difference will be in the
remedy obtained. Thus, the Court has not served the purpose that
purportedly drove its decision to turn away the facial challenge in
Gonzales—deciding the case based on a concrete fact scenario.
Indeed, it does not appear that the Roberts Court’s decisions will
prevent unnecessary constitutional adjudication in any respect. In
fact, these decisions potentially require courts to decide even more
constitutional questions than they already do in the abortion area and
to address problems that they most likely lack the competence to
resolve. For example, if the landscape created by Ayotte and Gonzales
is such that future challenges to abortion restrictions—for example on
the ground that those restrictions lack a health exception—will have
to be as-applied challenges seeking limited invalidation of the law,
then parties to those lawsuits will begin spending considerable time
and resources fighting over the scope of the injunction to be issued by
the district court. If the law is unconstitutional as applied, the key
question will become, “As applied to whom?”

102 David H. Gans, Severability as Judicial Lawmaking, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 639, 663,
669 (2008).
103 Cf. Borgmann, supra note 17, at 592–93 (arguing that “[r]equiring evidence of actual
harm in a challenge to a rights-infringing law defeats the very purpose of a pre-enforcement
challenge” and may be “morally troubling” in some cases).
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Unfortunately, the Supreme Court has given absolutely no
guidance as to how lower courts should answer that question. 104 If
plaintiffs were to mount a successful pre-enforcement as-applied
challenge based on the federal PBABA’s lack of an exception for
women who need the procedure for medical reasons, would the
district court then be expected to enjoin the statute only when the
procedure is “necessary, in appropriate medical judgment,” to avoid
“significant health risks” to the woman? 105 Or would the injunction
instead carve out specific, enumerated medical conditions that, if
present, would prevent application of the statute? 106 Would a district
court overstep its bounds if, following Justice Ginsburg’s suggestion,
it issued an injunction barring the law’s enforcement in its entirety
except where the procedure lacks any health benefit that makes it
superior to other procedures? 107 As should be apparent from these
examples, it is doubtful that judges possess the competency to make
the sort of medical decisions that are called for by such a scheme. 108
And it does not take much imagination to believe that those
injunctions might then be appealed as unconstitutionally narrow or
excessively broad, thus requiring further constitutional line-drawing
in this area.
Lurking behind these somewhat technical objections to the Court’s
decision to shift the focus of abortion jurisprudence to the problem of
remedies is a broader, more fundamental concern about the effect of
Ayotte and Gonzales on the future of the health exception. It seems
that the Court has effectively re-opened the issue of the meaning and
See Manian, supra note 97, at 619–20.
Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 161 (2007) (quoting Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood
of N. New Eng.¸ 546 U.S. 320, 327–28 (2006); Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505
U.S. 833, 879–80 (1992)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
106 See id. at 167 (stating that a pre-enforcement as-applied challenge “is the proper manner
to protect the health of the woman if it can be shown that in discrete and well-defined instances
a particular condition has or is likely to occur in which the procedure prohibited by the Act
must be used” (emphasis added)); Ayotte, 546 U.S. at 331 (“Only a few applications of New
Hampshire’s parental notification statute would present a constitutional problem. So long as
they are faithful to legislative intent, then, in this case the lower courts can issue a declaratory
judgment and an injunction prohibiting the statute’s unconstitutional application.”).
107 Gonzales, 550 U.S. at 189 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (arguing that the lower court’s
injunction should have been “trimmed only to exclude instances in which another procedure
would safeguard a woman's health at least equally well”).
108 Cf. Manian, supra note 97, at 622 (“Normally, we leave to the attending physician’s
judgment the determination of what is medically necessary . . . . Judges lack the medical
training to second-guess a treating physician’s medical judgment [in an individual case].”). I
have argued elsewhere that courts are more competent than legislators to decide disputed issues
of medical fact. See B. Jessie Hill, The Constitutional Right to Make Medical Treatment
Decisions: A Tale of Two Doctrines, 86 TEX. L. REV. 277, 332–41 (2007). I continue to believe
this is true, as a matter of comparative competence, but I doubt that either legislators or federal
judges are as well-qualified as physicians, in conjunction with their patients, to make medical
treatment decisions.
104
105
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scope of the health exception requirement itself in two important
respects. First, it is widely accepted that the importance, and therefore
the degree of protection, accorded to a particular constitutional
right—what Professor Daryl Levinson has called the “cash value” of
a right—“is a function of the remedial consequences attached to its
violation.” 109 Thus, one might argue that the Supreme Court has
essentially cheapened the abortion right by taking facial invalidation
off the table as a possible remedy for unconstitutional abortion
laws—or at least those that lack a health exception. 110 The
consequences of this cheapening are both real and meaningful, since
in some instances—the PBABA cases presumably being one—the
game will no longer be worth the candle and constitutional challenges
simply will not be brought. 111 Thus, contrary to Justice Ginsburg’s
prediction, 112 no as-applied challenges to the federal D&X ban have
been filed in the wake of the Court’s decision in Gonzales.
But perhaps even more profoundly, the Supreme Court has opened
the door to deciding questions that have long gone unanswered in its
jurisprudence—most likely for good reason. Since the Supreme
Court’s vague suggestion in Doe v. Bolton, 113 the companion case to
Roe v. Wade, that the word “health” in the abortion context should be
understood broadly, “in the light of all factors—physical, emotional,
psychological, familial, and the woman’s age—relevant to the
well-being of the patient” and in accordance with the physician’s
“best medical judgment,” the Supreme Court has avoided defining
or limiting the contours of the constitutionally required health
exception. 114 Instead, the Supreme Court has simply mandated a
health exception, with lower courts following suit. Legislatures, for
their part, have generally included in their abortion regulations health
exceptions that are sufficiently broad and general to avoid being
challenged, usually by adopting some version of the “medical
judgment” language of Roe and Doe. 115 Presumably, legislators knew
109 Daryl J. Levinson, Rights Essentialism and Remedial Equilibration, 99 COLUM. L. REV.
857, 874 (1999).
110 Cf. Hartnett, supra note 3, at 1756–57 (noting that facial challenges “raise the stakes” of
constitutional litigation and suggesting that the Supreme Court’s decision in Ayotte indicates a
desire to “lower[] the stakes in a time of transition” while awaiting Justice O’Connor’s
successor to the Court).
111 Cf. David L. Faigman, Defining Empirical Frames of Reference in Constitutional
Cases: Unraveling the As-Applied Versus Facial Distinction in Constitutional Law, 36
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 631, (2009) (predicting that few as-applied challenges will be brought
to future abortion regulations based on the lack of a health exception “not because they are
without merit, but because the structural impediments are too great”).
112 Gonzales, 550 U.S. at 189–90 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
113 410 U.S. 179 (1973).
114 Id. at 192.
115 See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. §390.01114(2)(d), (3)(b) (requiring parental notice for
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that to omit or tinker with the health exception meant risking
invalidation of the entire abortion regulation and having to start over
from scratch. 116 This state of affairs essentially created and preserved
a large realm of discretion for physicians, rather than courts or
legislatures, to decide when an abortion, or a particular abortion
procedure, was medically appropriate. Indeed, this right could even
be characterized as a separate right from the right to procreative
choice—it more closely resembles a right to protect one’s health
through seeking appropriate medical treatment. 117
Now, by opening up the health exception to specification—and
even requiring specification of its meaning and scope—the Court has
arguably changed the actual nature of the right. 118 The remedial tail,

abortions performed on minors, except, inter alia, if “In the physician's good faith clinical
judgment, a medical emergency exists and there is insufficient time for the attending physician
to comply with the notification requirements” and in turn defining “medical emergency” in
terms of the “physician's good faith clinical judgment”); IND. CODE § 16-34-2-4(i) (creating an
exception to the requirement of parental consent for minors seeking abortions “where there is an
emergency need for a medical procedure to be performed such that continuation of the
pregnancy provides an immediate threat and grave risk to the life or health of the pregnant
woman and the attending physician so certifies in writing”); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §
2317.56(A)(2) (West 2004) (requiring certain information be given to the woman before an
abortion is performed, unless there is a medical condition “that, in the reasonable judgment of
the physician who is attending the woman, so complicates the pregnancy that it necessitates the
immediate performance or inducement of an abortion”). There have been a few pre-Gonzales
challenges to statutes on the ground that the health exceptions are unconstitutionally narrow. See
Planned Parenthood of Idaho, Inc. v. Wasden, 376 F.3d 908. 924, 935 (9th Cir. 2004) (holding
unconstitutional a law requiring parental consent for minors seeking abortions except in the case
of “a sudden and unexpected physical condition which, in the reasonable medical judgment of
any ordinarily prudent physician acting under the circumstances and conditions then existing, is
abnormal and so complicates the medical condition of the pregnant minor as to necessitate the
immediate causing or performing of an abortion.”); Women’s Med. Prof’l Corp. v. Taft, 353
F.3d 436, 440, 450 (6th Cir. 2003) (upholding against constitutional challenge a health
exception that allowed the D&X procedure only when “necessary, in reasonable medical
judgment, to preserve the life or health of the mother as a result of the mother’s life or health
being endangered by a serious risk of the substantial and irreversible impairment of a major
bodily function” (emphasis added)).
116 See Hartnett, supra note 3, at 1756 (noting that “facial challenges raise the stakes” of
litigation).
117 Elsewhere, I have argued extensively that such a right exists, though its recognition has
not been consistent outside the abortion context. See Hill, supra note 108; see also John A.
Robertson, Controversial Medical Treatment and the Right to Health Care, HASTINGS CTR.
REP., Nov.–Dec. 2006, at 15, 15 (arguing that a negative right to health care “anchors a
woman’s use of abortion and contraception, and underlies the great deference ordinarily
accorded doctors and patients to pursue medical care”); Eugene Volokh, Medical Self-Defense,
Prohibited Experimental Therapies, and Payment for Organs, 120 HARV. L. REV. 1813, 1824
(2007) (inferring that the abortion cases recognize a constitutional “right to defend oneself using
medical care”).
118 Cf. Levinson, supra note 109, at 873 (discussing the concept of “remedial
equilibration,” which holds that “constitutional rights are inevitably shaped by, and incorporate,
remedial concerns”). But see, e.g., Melvyn R. Durchslag, Federalism and Constitutional
Liberties: Varying the Remedy to Save the Right, 54 N.Y.U. L. REV. 723, 749–53 (1979) (giving
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in other words, has started to wag the substantive doctrinal dog.
Instead of simply delegating medical decisions to physicians, both
legislators and courts will be asked to determine the meaning of
medical necessity, resulting in narrower and possibly inconsistent
definitions of it. The scope of the injunction in each particular case,
usually crafted by the district court based on the evidence before it,
will now determine the scope of the constitutional right of women to
protect their health with a medically necessary abortion. That
injunction may be broader or narrower in some geographic areas or
types of cases than in others. It would be an understatement to say
that this result is in tension with the prior state of affairs, according to
which the patient’s constitutional right to a medically necessary
abortion was sacrosanct and the appropriate choice of treatment was
left to the woman and her physician to decide.
Not only is this revised constitutional doctrine troubling from the
perspective of the women whose health may be put at risk while the
“new” meaning of the constitutionally required health exception is
worked out, it is troubling from the perspective of judicial modesty. It
appears that the Roberts Court has sub silentio overturned prior
substantive precedent pertaining to the health exception, while
leaving enormous doubt as to what must take its place. 119 It has thus
likely embroiled the lower federal courts in decisions about the scope
and meaning of the health exception for years to come.
CONCLUSION
A reader who is more sympathetic to the ideological leanings of
the newest Justices of the Roberts Court might claim that it is only
sensible to require more limited invalidation of laws regulating
abortion as a means of halting the “‘ad hoc nullification machine’ that
the Court has set in motion to push aside whatever doctrines of
constitutional law stand in the way of that highly favored practice.” 120
Indeed, one might argue that facial invalidation was far too powerful
medicine for a statute whose only ailment was the lack of a health
exception, and that the Supreme Court’s approach in Ayotte and

examples of cases in which the Supreme Court has issued narrow remedial rulings out of
federalism concerns without correspondingly narrowing the underlying constitutional rights).
119 Cf. Northland Family Planning Clinic, Inc. v. Cox, 487 F.3d 323, 340 (6th Cir. 2007)
(“[I]t is not apparent how and whether Gonzales diminishes the rule requiring an exception to
protect the woman’s life that does not impose upon her an increased medical risk.”).
120 Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 741 (2000) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting Madsen v.
Women’s Health Ctr., Inc., 512 U.S. 753, 785 (1994) (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment in part
and dissenting in part)).
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Gonzales merely restores a healthy state of affairs to constitutional
remedies doctrine. 121
Although an evaluation of the substantive merits of that view is
beyond the scope of this essay, I find the Court’s approach in Ayotte
and Gonzales to be unwise. I believe that it may subject some women
to significant health risks and lead to poor decisionmaking about
important medical issues. In any case, whether wise or foolish, the
Roberts Court’s decisions in those cases are anything but modest.
They herald potentially radical changes to substantive constitutional
doctrine under the guise of judicial restraint.

121

See, e.g., Collett, supra note 2, at 732.

